[E1O]⇒ Read Gratis The Reagan Revolution III Defeating the Soviet Challenge Richard C Thornton 9781425124144 Books

The Reagan Revolution III Defeating the Soviet Challenge Richard C Thornton 9781425124144 Books

Download As PDF : The Reagan Revolution III Defeating the Soviet Challenge Richard C Thornton 9781425124144 Books

The Reagan Revolution III Defeating the Soviet Challenge Richard C Thornton 9781425124144 Books

This is the third in the author's series of books on Reagan's foreign policy, and the most exciting book by far. This book shows how Reagan defeated the Soviet bid for global hegemony. The interrelated focuses of the book are the Soviet effort to manipulate the Iran-Iraq War to force Iran into the Soviet camp; the Soviet effort to prevent the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe; the Soviet plan to deploy SS-20 missiles to Grenada, and the US invasion of Grenada that pre-empts this plan; and, the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007). A sub-theme of the book is the struggle in Washington between those who wanted to reconstruct containment and achieve victory in the Cold War, and those who wanted to reach an accommodation (detente) with the USSR.

Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, Thornton describes the numerous failures of the Carter administration that led to the fall of the Shah and created an immense opportunity for the Soviets. He considers that the Soviet strategy was to have their client, Saddam Hussein, attack Iran. Then, the Soviets would supply both sides, in due course weakening Iran sufficiently that Soviet proxies within Iran could seize power (Thornton details several such power grabs). The Soviets increased their political appeal to Iran by offering to have their Syrian clients attack Iraq (though the Soviets never actually intended to carry this through). Carter recklessly encouraged Iraq to attack Iran, hoping that the Iranian need for US military aid would force them to release the hostages before the 1980 election, but this only drove the Iranians closer to the USSR. In 1981 and 1982, Al Haig sought to prevent the US from re-establishing relations with Iran (because this would reconstruct containment). Thus, Haig sought a de facto alliance with Iraq, which he pursued by encouraging Israel to strike into Lebanon and thus distract Syria from attacking Iraq (which was, as Thornton notes, never a real prospect). Reagan, on the other hand, wanted to keep Israel out of Lebanon (because this would enrage the Saudis and Egyptians) and ultimately wanted to engage Iran. Haig's views prevailed, but his determined opposition to the President on this and other issues - especially the Falklands - precipitated his removal.

Thornton notes the Soviet determination to prevent the deployment of US INF missiles to Europe, thus splitting the NATO alliance and establishing Soviet dominance in western Europe. These missiles threatened Soviet preeminence in Europe and the Soviet strategic advantage over the USA. Thus, they had to be countered, both by bullying the Europeans into abandoning the deployment and by deploying Soviet missiles to Grenada. The only question for the Soviets was whether the SS-20s should go to Grenada before or after the Pershings went to Germany. Thornton shows how both the US and USSR attempted to influence the critical reelection bid of German Chancellor Kohl, who supported the INF missile deployments. The Star Wars speech indicated to the Soviets that the US had the will and the means to blunt their drive for strategic superiority. This also shifted the competition to an arena of US advantage - high technology.

The only places the Soviets could deploy an "analogous" weapon to the Pershing II were Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname. The Soviets needed to deploy SS-20s by air, as 1962 showed that a sea deployment was too slow. Only Grenada and Suriname were within non-stop range of West Africa using Soviet air transports capable of carrying SS-20 missiles. Soviet efforts to prepare for this gambit, and US efforts to prevent it, dominated superpower policy in the Caribbean from 1981 to 1983. In 1983, Reagan convinced the Brazilians to bribe Suriname to remain out of the Soviet orbit. This left only Grenada. The Soviets tried to divert attention from Grenada as a missile base by various means, including, the author argues, by having Soviet proxies bomb the US embassy in Beirut. When the Soviet missile sites on Grenada were nearly complete, SS-20 missiles "disappeared" from the USSR, and Cuban troops were about to reinforce Grenada, Reagan ordered an invasion of the island. The truck bombings in Beirut were a last desperate Soviet effort to divert US attention from Grenada, but this failed.

Thornton notes that the Soviets sought to reinforce its quest for strategic superiority with a "creeping breakout" from the ABM Treaty that would make a national missile defense system operational. Intense US intelligence concern about this breakout centered, in early 1983, on the phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk. The author argues that the imperative need to determine the purpose of this radar - was an ABM breakout imminent or not? - was the genesis of the KAL 007 tragedy. The author claims the KAL 007 flight was a US-sponsored covert probe of Soviet air defenses, though the Soviet decision to shoot the airliner down was unexpected. Thornton attributes this decision to Marshal Ogarkov's "determination to shift Andropov's policy into a more confrontational course." Thornton also argues that Andropov in fact died the night of the KAL flight. He contends that the 747 did not crash into the sea, but landed on Sakhalin Island. Ogarkov hoped to go over the aircraft for spy equipment and interrogate the crew to prove the flight was a spy mission. But, when they discovered that there were Americans on board but no spy equipment, the Soviets executed the passengers and denied they had the plane. The upside, from the American perspective, was that the flight revealed that the Soviets were not ready to activate their nationwide missile defense, and thus the US could invade Grenada and deploy missiles to Europe without fear of triggering war.

By the spring of 1984, Soviet strategy had failed completely. Iran had avoided being taken over by pro-Soviet elements, the US had deployed missiles to Europe, and the invasion of Grenada denied the Soviets a Caribbean missile base. This forced the Soviets to reassess their global strategy.

In sum, this is the best assessment of the global struggle from 1981 to 1984, and I highly recommend it.


Tags : The Reagan Revolution, III: Defeating the Soviet Challenge [Richard C. Thornton] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. History of the U.S.- Soviet relations during the first term of Ronald Reagan, during which the president defeated the Soviet drive for strategic weapons superiority,Richard C. Thornton,The Reagan Revolution, III: Defeating the Soviet Challenge,Trafford Publishing,1425124143,General,Public Policy - Economic Policy,History,United States,History General,Political Science,Political Science Public Policy Economic Policy,PoliticsInternational Relations

The Reagan Revolution III Defeating the Soviet Challenge Richard C Thornton 9781425124144 Books Reviews

You have misprinted the subtitle of the book. It is Defeating the Soviet Challenge, NOT Rebuilding the Soviet Challenge. Please correct. The book itself is the best account of the first term of the Reagan Administration in print.
This is the third in the author's series of books on Reagan's foreign policy, and the most exciting book by far. This book shows how Reagan defeated the Soviet bid for global hegemony. The interrelated focuses of the book are the Soviet effort to manipulate the Iran-Iraq War to force Iran into the Soviet camp; the Soviet effort to prevent the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe; the Soviet plan to deploy SS-20 missiles to Grenada, and the US invasion of Grenada that pre-empts this plan; and, the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007). A sub-theme of the book is the struggle in Washington between those who wanted to reconstruct containment and achieve victory in the Cold War, and those who wanted to reach an accommodation (detente) with the USSR.

Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, Thornton describes the numerous failures of the Carter administration that led to the fall of the Shah and created an immense opportunity for the Soviets. He considers that the Soviet strategy was to have their client, Saddam Hussein, attack Iran. Then, the Soviets would supply both sides, in due course weakening Iran sufficiently that Soviet proxies within Iran could seize power (Thornton details several such power grabs). The Soviets increased their political appeal to Iran by offering to have their Syrian clients attack Iraq (though the Soviets never actually intended to carry this through). Carter recklessly encouraged Iraq to attack Iran, hoping that the Iranian need for US military aid would force them to release the hostages before the 1980 election, but this only drove the Iranians closer to the USSR. In 1981 and 1982, Al Haig sought to prevent the US from re-establishing relations with Iran (because this would reconstruct containment). Thus, Haig sought a de facto alliance with Iraq, which he pursued by encouraging Israel to strike into Lebanon and thus distract Syria from attacking Iraq (which was, as Thornton notes, never a real prospect). Reagan, on the other hand, wanted to keep Israel out of Lebanon (because this would enrage the Saudis and Egyptians) and ultimately wanted to engage Iran. Haig's views prevailed, but his determined opposition to the President on this and other issues - especially the Falklands - precipitated his removal.

Thornton notes the Soviet determination to prevent the deployment of US INF missiles to Europe, thus splitting the NATO alliance and establishing Soviet dominance in western Europe. These missiles threatened Soviet preeminence in Europe and the Soviet strategic advantage over the USA. Thus, they had to be countered, both by bullying the Europeans into abandoning the deployment and by deploying Soviet missiles to Grenada. The only question for the Soviets was whether the SS-20s should go to Grenada before or after the Pershings went to Germany. Thornton shows how both the US and USSR attempted to influence the critical reelection bid of German Chancellor Kohl, who supported the INF missile deployments. The Star Wars speech indicated to the Soviets that the US had the will and the means to blunt their drive for strategic superiority. This also shifted the competition to an arena of US advantage - high technology.

The only places the Soviets could deploy an "analogous" weapon to the Pershing II were Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname. The Soviets needed to deploy SS-20s by air, as 1962 showed that a sea deployment was too slow. Only Grenada and Suriname were within non-stop range of West Africa using Soviet air transports capable of carrying SS-20 missiles. Soviet efforts to prepare for this gambit, and US efforts to prevent it, dominated superpower policy in the Caribbean from 1981 to 1983. In 1983, Reagan convinced the Brazilians to bribe Suriname to remain out of the Soviet orbit. This left only Grenada. The Soviets tried to divert attention from Grenada as a missile base by various means, including, the author argues, by having Soviet proxies bomb the US embassy in Beirut. When the Soviet missile sites on Grenada were nearly complete, SS-20 missiles "disappeared" from the USSR, and Cuban troops were about to reinforce Grenada, Reagan ordered an invasion of the island. The truck bombings in Beirut were a last desperate Soviet effort to divert US attention from Grenada, but this failed.

Thornton notes that the Soviets sought to reinforce its quest for strategic superiority with a "creeping breakout" from the ABM Treaty that would make a national missile defense system operational. Intense US intelligence concern about this breakout centered, in early 1983, on the phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk. The author argues that the imperative need to determine the purpose of this radar - was an ABM breakout imminent or not? - was the genesis of the KAL 007 tragedy. The author claims the KAL 007 flight was a US-sponsored covert probe of Soviet air defenses, though the Soviet decision to shoot the airliner down was unexpected. Thornton attributes this decision to Marshal Ogarkov's "determination to shift Andropov's policy into a more confrontational course." Thornton also argues that Andropov in fact died the night of the KAL flight. He contends that the 747 did not crash into the sea, but landed on Sakhalin Island. Ogarkov hoped to go over the aircraft for spy equipment and interrogate the crew to prove the flight was a spy mission. But, when they discovered that there were Americans on board but no spy equipment, the Soviets executed the passengers and denied they had the plane. The upside, from the American perspective, was that the flight revealed that the Soviets were not ready to activate their nationwide missile defense, and thus the US could invade Grenada and deploy missiles to Europe without fear of triggering war.

By the spring of 1984, Soviet strategy had failed completely. Iran had avoided being taken over by pro-Soviet elements, the US had deployed missiles to Europe, and the invasion of Grenada denied the Soviets a Caribbean missile base. This forced the Soviets to reassess their global strategy.

In sum, this is the best assessment of the global struggle from 1981 to 1984, and I highly recommend it.